[PATCH] openwrt-keyring: Only copy sign key for snapshots

Hauke Mehrtens hauke at hauke-m.de
Sun May 16 06:23:57 PDT 2021

On 5/15/21 4:44 PM, Daniel Golle wrote:
> On Sat, May 15, 2021 at 04:28:58PM +0200, Hauke Mehrtens wrote:
>> On 5/15/21 1:34 AM, Daniel Golle wrote:
>>> On Fri, May 14, 2021 at 11:31:27PM +0200, Hauke Mehrtens wrote:
>>>> On 5/14/21 12:17 PM, Paul Spooren wrote:
>>>>> Hi,
>>>>> On 5/13/21 1:32 AM, Hauke Mehrtens wrote:
>>>>>> Instead of adding all public signature keys from the openwrt-keyring
>>>>>> repository only add the key which is used to sign the master feeds.
>>>>>> If one of the other keys would be compromised this would not affect
>>>>>> users of master snapshot builds.
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Hauke Mehrtens <hauke at hauke-m.de>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>> Thanks for working on this.
>>>>> I'm still in favor to include a *openwrt-next* key which becomes the
>>>>> signing key for the next release. This way a upgrade step between
>>>>> release branches is possible.
>>>> I would prefer to create it closer to the next release.
>>>>>> As far as I know the other keys are not compromised, this is just a
>>>>>> precaution.
>>>>>> I would do similar changes to 21.02 and 19.07 to only add the key which
>>>>>> is used for this specific release.
>>>>> In case of 19.07 please add 21.02 release keys as well, since it's *the
>>>>> next key*.
>>>> Yes, good idea.
>>>>>> Instead of adding just this single key, should we add all keys of
>>>>>> currently maintained releases like 19.07, 21.02 and master key into all
>>>>>> 3 branches?
>>>>> How about adding keys like that:
>>>>> 19.07: 19.07 + 21.02 keys
>>>>> 21.02: 21.02 + openwrt-next keys
>>>>> snapshot: snapshot key
>>>>> The snapshot key stays the same "forever", it shouldn't be included 
>>>>> releases.
>>>>>> The signature verification of sysupgrade images is currently not used as
>>>>>> far as I know, so normal we do not need the keys for of other releases.
>>>>> If the `ucert` package is installed and the env variable
>>>>> `REQUIRE_IMAGE_SIGNATURE` is set, the images are verified. This should
>>>>> eventually become the default.
>>>> How reliable is this working?
>>> I've been using ucert on many devices for a long time for now.
>>> In order to be more secure, the signed data should be normalized
>>> (ie. sorted and non-relevant data removed), which has not been done
>>> yet. Right now, hash collissions could be constructed by changing
>>> the order of fields and/or adding useless additional data -- however,
>>> that would still mean having to break SHA256.
>>> Generally, to be considered more than just a small extra barrier
>>> or even a security risk, much more review would be needed. See:
>>> https://git.openwrt.org/?p=project/ucert.git;a=blob;f=README.md;hb=refs/heads/master#l6
>>>> Currently we do not ship ucert by default and this is needed to check the
>>>> image signature.
>>> People can, however, install ucert which enabled signature checks
>>> of future sysupgrade. When using 'auc' or 'luci-app-attendedsysupgrade'
>>> for upgrade, all explicitely installed packages are also kept accross
>>> updates, and that can include 'ucert' (which is what I've been doing
>>> for a while now on my local devices)
>> Ok this is nice.
>> I tried to check the signature of the 21.02-rc1 release and it failed:
>> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>> root at OpenWrt:/tmp# REQUIRE_IMAGE_SIGNATURE=1 sysupgrade -T openwrt-21.02.0-rc1-ath79-generic-tplink_tl-wdr4300-v1-squashfs-sysupgrade.bin
>> cert_verify: cannot parse cert
>> Image check failed.
>> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>> With a self build image it works.
>> It contains "# fake certificate" where I would expect the certificate.
>> Is this expected?
> Yes and no :)
> No, because in this way ucert is pretty useless.
> Yes, because this is how buildbots are configured to do things at this
> point:
> https://git.openwrt.org/?p=buildbot.git;a=blob;f=phase1/master.cfg;h=a85382ae4fd2ee52d0d102fc90be7f721a2dfe86;hb=HEAD#l986
> The goal of ucert is to allow key delegation, as described in the
> README.md in ucert.git. Like this we could have builders generate
> keys with short lifetime, have them signed by a more protected
> instance and have the option to revoke them, if needed.

Ok thank you Daniel for the clarification.

So people are fine with the original patch to only include the master 
key into the image. I will send seperate patches for 21.02 and 19.07.

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