[OpenWrt-Devel] IPv6 firewall and Port Control Protocol (Was: Barrier Breaker 14.07-rc1)
moeller0 at gmx.de
Fri Jul 18 08:06:59 EDT 2014
Hi Gui, hi list,
Gesendet: Freitag, 18. Juli 2014 um 05:56 Uhr
Von: "Gui Iribarren" <gui at altermundi.net>
An: openwrt-devel at lists.openwrt.org
Betreff: Re: [OpenWrt-Devel] IPv6 firewall and Port Control Protocol (Was: Barrier Breaker 14.07-rc1)
On 17/07/14 21:59, Fernando Frediani wrote:
> > Perfect and well said.
> > Really don't see why people still think leaving firewalls opened is a
> > good idea.
> leaving *hosts* firewalls opened is a really bad idea. Agreed.
> But openwrt doesn't run on hosts, it runs on network equipment
> I.e. the building blocks of Internet.
> Carriers don't block traffic,
> ISP don't block traffic,
> and back in the day, CPE equipment didn't block traffic either (think of
> dialup, or dumb cablemodems which would simply act as a bridge)
> "firewall" was a software installed in the computer connected to the
> Then, with the ever increasing quantity of devices vs the evident
> shortage of IPv4, people started to use NAT, or ISPs started to ship
> CPEs that would do NAT, which made two-way transparent communication
Well, with the growth of the internet also the profitability grew, so malware grew along with the internet. So the need for NAT and the need for more secure home setups co-developed, I would say.
> I find it difficult to argue that NAT success was driven by a security
> concern, rather than by IP scarcity. :P 
> Fast-forward a few years, we have a new Internet Protocol being widely
> deployed that solves the address scarcity, and thus makes NAT unnecessary.
Sure, NAT can easily go the way of the Dodo, as long as we keep dropping unsolicited inbound traffic in the router's firewall ;)
> Now CPEs can work again like transparent devices.
> ps. RFCs that argue that NAT resulted in a *reduction in security*...
Yes, but we are talking not about having openwrt default to ipv6 NAT but what to do with unsolicited inbound traffic, not exactly what is dicussed in the cited rfc...
> : http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6092.txt , january/2011
> Security Considerations
> The IPv6 stateful filtering behavior described in this document is
> intended to be similar in function to the filtering behavior of
> commonly used IPv4/NAT gateways, which have been widely sold as a
> security tool for residential and small-office/home-office networks.
> As noted in the Security Considerations section of [RFC2993], the
> true impact of these tools may be a reduction in security. It may be
> generally assumed that the impacts discussed in that document related
> to filtering (and not translation) are to be expected with the simple
> IPv6 security mechanisms described here.
> In particular, it is worth noting that stateful filters create the
> illusion of a security barrier, but without the managed intent of a
> firewall. Appropriate security mechanisms implemented in the end
What exactly is "managed intent of a firewall"?
> nodes, in conjunction with the [RFC4864] local network protection
> methods, function without reliance on network layer hacks and
> transport filters that may change over time. Also, defined security
> barriers assume that threats originate in the exterior, which may
> lead to practices that result in applications being fully exposed to
> interior attack and which therefore make breaches much easier.
> : http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2993.txt[http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2993.txt] , november/2000,
> 11. Summary
> NAT advantages - no item about security
Did you read the last bullet point on opage 8 of rfc 2993? Where NAT is likened with port filtering firewalls in regard to inbound connections, that does not use the word security, but implies it nevertheless.
So the RFC explicitly recommends to close all ports by default! And there is a tacked on rant about the 'illusion of security' by an unmanaged firewall is quite funny in thid threads context, as people who can/will not keep the firewall well-configured, surely will manage to keep all their local endpoint machines fully patched, upgraded and securely configured. Your proposal will expose exactly the internaol network nodes of thiose that already have shown not to be too interested in securing their setup... (with the main justification, IIRC, how nice it would be to run open server's on other people's networks).
> At the end it will bring more problems than solutions for those using
> OpenWRT and play against its good reputation.
> As mentioned before adjusting firewall for specific needs or using UPnP
> isn't the end of the world.
> On 18/07/2014 01:03, David Lang wrote:
>> I know that IPv6 designers pine for the "good old days" of the
>> Internet when no security was needed.
>> But the reality is that hackers and worms have shown that leaving
>> systems exposed to the Internet is just a Bad Idea.
>> As such, the idea that IPv6 would "restore" the "everyone can connect
>> to everyone on any port" of the early '80s was wishful thinking at best.
>> link-local addressing isn't a good idea, because the average home will
>> have three separate links (wired plus two bands of wireless), these
>> can get bridged together, but that causes problems as well.
>> There is no answer here that will satisfy everyone.
>> But do you really want to see the news stories about how anyone
>> running openwrt is vulnerable to $lastest_windows_exploit but people
>> running stock firmware aren't?
>> Yes, it would be ideal if every host was locked down so that it was
>> safe for them to be exposed.
>> But that's not the world we live in.
>> David Lang
>> On Wed, 16 Jul 2014, Lyme Marionette wrote:
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> On Wednesday, July 16, 2014 2:10:53 PM "Gui Iribarren"
>>> <gui at altermundi.net> wrote:
>>>> Benjamin is giving some great examples of real-world scenarios where
>>>> default-open firewall simplifies administration,
>>>> and where a default-closed firewall would be not only unnecessary
>>>> (provides no benefits), but would indeed complicate setting up
>>> There have been many good arguments posted on this subject and to
>>> throw my opinion in, it a question of effort and expectations.
>>> I think everyone can agree that:
>>> -It takes equal effort to turn a firewall on, as it does to turn one
>>> -It takes equal effort to create a specific block list, as it does to
>>> create a specific allow list.
>>> -UPnP is not included by default for either the ipv4 or ipv6 stacks.
>>> I would also go further to suggest that:
>>> -Consistency is good, even if it consistent for superficial reasons.
>>> We know that, for NAT reasons, that the ipv4 stack by default blocks
>>> incoming connections:
>>> -Because it doesn't know by default where to route them.
>>> -ipv4 end-points have been traditionally insecure.
>>> The two ways to get around this (for gaming, etc):
>>> -Through setting firewall rules to route the traffic to an end-point.
>>> -Through the use of UPnP (which is used by most games to host, and
>>> gaming consoles).
>>> With the adoption of ipv6 there is the opportunity to change this
>>> behaviour such that instead of incoming traffic being restricted for
>>> technical reasons, that incoming traffic is routed to the correct
>>> However, that begs the questions:
>>> A) Is that consistent with what people would expect?
>>> B) Are ipv6 end-points secure by design?
>>> In regards to A, from the mindset of a non-technical user, would
>>> wager that the answer is 'no'. Even though there is a change in
>>> technology with ipv6, the ipv6 technology fulfills the same role as
>>> ipv4 and this could be seen as opposing direction between the two.
>>> This would likely catch many end-users by surprize unless they read
>>> the small print regarding this.
>>> As for B, given my view of software development, applications,
>>> networks, etc (I've been in the IT business for over 25 years now) I
>>> would wager that 80% of applications are secure, and that the 0ther
>>> 20% make the potential change in policy very risky.
>>> IMO, which others may disagree with, would be to include UPnP by
>>> default which would/should resolve most of the hosting issues.
>>> openwrt-devel mailing list
>>> openwrt-devel at lists.openwrt.org
>> openwrt-devel mailing list
>> openwrt-devel at lists.openwrt.org
> openwrt-devel mailing list
> openwrt-devel at lists.openwrt.org
openwrt-devel mailing list
openwrt-devel at lists.openwrt.org
openwrt-devel mailing list
openwrt-devel at lists.openwrt.org
More information about the openwrt-devel